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Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of multi-party entity authentication. We prove that the lower
bound on the number of messages of multi-party challenge-response protocols is 2n − 1, where n
is the number of the participants of the protocol, and proposes two protocols that achieve this lower
bound. Our protocols are, thus, efficient in the sense that they use the minimum number of messages
required to solve the multi-party entity authentication problem based on challenge-response principles.
Keywords: challenge-response protocols, entity authentication, protocol graph, reflection attack.
1. Introduction
Entity authentication is the process whereby a party gains assurance of the identity
of another party involved in a protocol [7]. Entity authentication is a fundamental
security service, which is used for preventing impersonation and unauthorized ac-
cess to services in distributed systems. Common examples for entity authentication
include user authentication in computer systems (login procedure) and subscriber
authentication in GSM networks.
Strong entity authentication is based on cryptographic challenge-response
protocols, in which a party (the prover) proves its identity to another party (the
verifier) by demonstrating knowledge of a secret that is known to be associated
with the prover. This is done by providing a response to a time-variant challenge,
where the response depends on both the secret and the challenge in such a way that an
attacker cannot obtain the secret from the response. Furthermore, since subsequent
challenges differ, the attacker cannot use the response from one execution of the
protocol in a subsequent execution. Depending on the mechanisms used, the verifier
may or may not know the secret that is used in the computation of the response. If
the verifier does not know the secret, nevertheless, it can still verify the response,
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then the protocol is called zero-knowledge protocol [10]. In this paper, we are not
concerned with this type of protocols, but exclusively focus on classical challenge-
response protocols, where the verifier knows the secret associated with the prover,
and uses it to verify the response.
A considerable amount of work has been carried out on the design and analysis
of two-party challenge-response protocols for entity authentication [9, 3]. In this
paper, we consider the multi-party case, which, to the best of our knowledge, has
been neglected so far. In multi-party entity authentication, each of the n (n ≥ 2)
participating parties proves its identity to each of the other parties. Although, in
principle, multi-party entity authentication can be obtained by running two-party
mutual entity authentication protocols between each pair of parties, in practice, this
approach is not desirable, because it leads to highly inefficient protocols that use
O(n2) messages. We propose much more efficient protocols that use only O(n)
messages. Furthermore, we show that our protocols are optimal in the sense that
no protocol can solve the problem with less numbers of messages than ours do.
In spite of their apparent simplicity, the design of entity authentication pro-
tocols is surprisingly error prone, especially, if they are combined with session key
establishment. Many protocols have been proposed that were found to be flawed
and vulnerable to some forms of replay attack later [5]. The reason for this is that
flaws are usually subtle and hard to find. In order to solve this problem, many papers
propose methods that can be used for formal verification of entity authentication
and key establishment protocols [4, 6, 11], and principles that can help to avoid
common mistakes in their design [1, 2]. In this paper, we do not aim at contributing
to these efforts, but we rather build on them: we adhere to the design principles of
[1] and use a formal logic [11] to explain some of the subtle details of our protocols.
The outline of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we introduce our
system model and clarify the concept of entity authentication in this model. Then,
in Section 3, we prove that the lower bound on the number of messages of multi-
party challenge-response protocols for entity authentication is 2n − 1, where n is
the number of participants of the protocol. Before presenting our protocols, which
achieve this lower bound, we review two flawed entity authentication protocols in
Section 4. Our aim is to give an insight into two design principles that our protocols
build on. In Section 5 we present our protocols and analyze them with the help of
a formal logic. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
2. System Model and the Goal of Entity Authentication
We consider a system that consists of a set of principals (users, hosts, and processes)
and a network that connects them. Principals communicate with each other by
sending messages via the network. In order to authenticate each other, a subset
of the principals may engage in a given multi-party entity authentication protocol.
We assume that all the principals know this protocol. We also assume that any of
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the principals can play any of the roles in the protocol1 (e.g., in case of two-party
protocols, anybody can be initiator as well as responder). We further assume that
principals may run several instances of the protocol concurrently, and play different
roles in different instances.
As usual in the literature [8], we assume that the network is under the control
of the attacker. This means that the attacker can observe every message sent via the
network, furthermore, it can intercept, modify, generate, delay, and replay messages
or parts of them. We assume that the attacker knows the protocol that is run by the
principals, and it may try to play any of its roles. In addition, it can arrange that a
principal starts an instance of the protocol at any time chosen by the attacker. On the
other hand, the attacker does not know any of the long-term secrets associated with
legitimate principals (see also next paragraph), and it cannot break the cryptographic
primitives used for encryption, digital signature, etc. This leaves the attacker with
the only possibility to mount a replay attack, in which it tries to impersonate some
principals by constructing fake messages from data recorded in previous and/or
concurrent runs of the protocol.
Sometimes we assume that the attacker compromised the long-term secret
of a principal or a small subset of principals. In this case, we are interested in
if the attacker can use the compromised secret(s) to impersonate a principal that
is not compromised. If the authentication protocol is designed properly, then this
should not be possible. Note, however, that the attacker can always impersonate
the compromised principals, no matter how careful the design of the authentication
protocol was.
As we said before, entity authentication is the process whereby a party gains
assurance of the identity of another party involved in a protocol. At first sight,
this suggests that a principal can use an entity authentication protocol to verify that
the identity of another principal with which it communicates (i.e., from which it
received a message), is as claimed. Note, however, that in our system model, each
principal does actually communicate with the attacker, because messages are sent to
and received from the network, which is under the control of the attacker. What can
an entity authentication protocol achieve in this model? Indeed, all we can expect
from a correct entity authentication protocol is that it guarantees for a principal
who successfully run it that the assumed other participating principals were present
and sent some messages during the protocol run. We formalize this concept in the
following definition:
Definition 1 (Entity authentication) Let us consider two principals A and B. We
say that A authenticated B if there exists a bounded time interval I in the local time
of A such that A is convinced that B was alive (i.e., sent some messages) in I .
Example 1 As an example let us consider the following unilateral two-party entity
authentication protocol:
1 Later, we will introduce special roles (e.g., authentication server), which can be played only by
designated principals. We omit this issue in the presentation of the general system model, because it
depends on the particular protocol in question.
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1. B → A : {T }K−b .
The protocol works as follows: B digitally signs the current value T of its local
clock using its private key K−b , and sends the signed time-stamp {T }K−b to A. It is
assumed that the clocks of A and B are synchronized with some accuracy t . This
means that at any time t the local clock ca(t) of A and the local clock cb(t) of B
do not differ more than t (i.e., ∀t : |ca(t) − cb(t)| ≤ t). When A receives the
message, it verifies the digital signature of B. If this verification is successful, then
A authenticated B, since it is convinced that B was alive and used its private key at









Fig. 1. A is convinced that B was alive at some time in the interval [T −t, T +t]
Example 2 Another common example for a unilateral two-party entity authentica-
tion protocol is the following:
1. A → B : r
2. B → A : {r}K−b
Here, A generates an unpredictable random number r , and sends it to B at time
T1 in its local time. B signs r with its private key K−b , and sends the result {r}K−b
back to A. A receives B’s response at time T2 in its local time, and verifies that it
is indeed its random number r signed by B. If this verification is successful, then
A authenticated B, since it is convinced that B was alive and used its private key at
some time in the interval [T1, T2] (see Fig. 2). 2
3. Lower Bound on the Number of Messages
After having defined what we mean by entity authentication, we now turn our
attention to multi-party entity authentication protocols in which each party au-
thenticates every other participating party. We are exclusively concerned with
challenge-response type protocols, where authentication is based on response to an






Fig. 2. A is convinced that B was alive at some time in the interval [T1, T2]
unpredictable random challenge (like in Example 2). The question we investigate
in this section is: What is the lower bound on the number of messages in multi-party
challenge-response protocols for entity authentication?
We start by constructing a model of the protocol, in which we abstract away
from the exact content of messages and retain only the message passing structure
of the protocol:
Definition 2 (Protocol graph) Let us represent a protocol with a directed graph
G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges in G. Each
vertex of G represents a party of the protocol, and it is labelled with the name of that
party. The edges of G correspond to the messages of the protocol; each message
sent by party A to party B is represented by a directed edge from the vertex that is
labeled with A to the vertex that is labeled with B.
We define the following binary relations on the edges of G:
Definition 3 (Precedence) The precedence relation is a subset P of E × E such
that for all (e, f ) ∈ P the message that corresponds to e is sent earlier than the
message that corresponds to f in every execution of the protocol. If (e, f ) ∈ P,
then we say that e precedes f or f succeeds e, and we denote this by e ≺ f .
Definition 4 (Precedence or equality) The precedence or equality relation is a
subset P ′ of E × E defined as P′ = P ∪ {(e, f ) ∈ E × E : e = f }. We use the
e  f notation to denote that (e, f ) ∈ P′.
It is clear that if the message e is always sent earlier than the message f , and
f is always sent earlier than g, then e is always sent earlier than g, which means
that P and P ′ are transitive (i.e., e ≺ f ≺ g implies e ≺ g, and e  f  g implies
e  g). In addition, P′ is reflexive and antisymmetric as well (i.e., e  e, and
e  f and f  e implies e = f ). Therefore, P′ is a partial ordering. The reason
for being only partial and not total ordering is that the protocol may have concurrent
messages, the order of which cannot be guaranteed. This means that G may have
two edges e and f , such that neither e  f nor f  e.
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We find it convenient in explaining the theory to introduce a notation for
directly preceding edges:
Definition 5 (Direct precedence) An edge e directly precedes an edge f , denoted
by e  f , if e ≺ f and there is no other edge g such that e ≺ g ≺ f .
The following lemma states that directly preceding edges must be joined by
a common vertex:
Lemma 1 Let us consider a protocol graph G. If for two edges e = (u, v) and
f = (w, z) in G, e  f , then v = w.
Proof: Let us assume that v = w. This means that they correspond to different
parties of the protocol. Let the parties that belong to v and w be A and B, re-
spectively. In order to guarantee that message f is sent after message e in every
execution of the protocol, A and B must be synchronized: A must be able to notify
B that e arrived, and B must send f only if it received this notification. This means,
however, that the protocol must have a message g (the notification), which succeeds
e and precedes f . This contradicts our assumption that e  f . 2
Lemma 2 Let us consider a protocol graph G. If for two edges e and f inG, e ≺ f ,
then either e  f , or there is a sequence of edges g1, g2, . . . , gk , where k ≥ 1,
such that e  g1  g2  . . . gk  f .
Proof: Let us denote the set of edges that succeeds e and precedes f by G (i.e.,
G = {g ∈ E : e ≺ g ≺ f }). If G is empty, then e  f by definition. So let us
assume that G is not empty. Let g be (one of) the “latest” edge(s) in G (i.e., there
is no g′ ∈ G such that g ≺ g′). Note that because of the finite size of G, and thus
G, such an edge always exists. g must directly precede f , because if there was an
edge g′ such that g ≺ g′ ≺ f , then g′ would be in G, and g would not be (one of)
the latest edge(s). Thus, we have that e ≺ g  f . Now we can repeat the same
argument for e ≺ g. Since G is finite, after a finite number k of repetition, we are
done. 2
According to Definition 1, a party A authenticated a party B if A is convinced
that B was alive and sent some messages in a bounded time interval I in the local
time of A. In case of challenge-response protocols, I is defined by the time of
sending a challenge and the time of receiving a response. Therefore, the following
lemma holds for any challenge-response protocol for entity authentication:
Lemma 3 Let us consider a challenge-response protocol for entity authentication
and its protocol graph G. Let A and B be two parties of the protocol, and let us
denote the vertices that correspond to A and B by u and v, respectively. If party A
authenticates party B in the protocol, then there exist three edges e, e′, and f in G
such that e is an outgoing edge from u (challenge), e′ is an incoming edge to u, f
is an outgoing edge from v (response), and e ≺ f  e′.
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Corollary of Lemma 3: A direct consequence of the previous lemma is that if each
party authenticates at least one other party in the protocol, then each vertex of G
has an outgoing edge e and an incoming edge e′ such that e ≺ e′. 2
Lemma 4 Let us consider a challenge-response protocol for entity authentication
and its protocol graph G. If each party authenticates every other party in the
protocol, then any two vertices of G are connected with a directed path.
Proof: Let us consider two vertices u and v of G, where u corresponds to party A
and v corresponds to party B. Because of Lemma 3, there exist two edges e and f
such that e originates from u, f originates from v, and e ≺ f . Using Lemma2, we
get that either e  f , or there is a sequence of edges g1, g2, . . . , gk, (k ≥ 1) such
that e  g1  g2  . . .  gk  f . Because of Lemma 1, this means, in both
cases, that there is a directed path from u to v. 2
Corollary of Lemma 4: A consequence of Lemma 4 is that if each party authen-
ticates every other party in the protocol, then the protocol graph is connected.
2
We now introduce the notion of unfolded protocol graphs. The unfolded
protocol graph G˜ of the protocol graphG can be obtained by the following procedure:
We build up G˜ fromG step-by-step starting from an empty graph and extending
it with one new edge taken from G in each step. During the construction ofG˜, we
execute a depth-first search on the edges of G following the direct precedence
relation on the edges. This search determines the order in which the edges of G are
processed and inserted in G˜, as well as the originating vertex of each new edge inG˜.
Let us assume that the first edge given by the depth-first search is e = (u, v).
Since at this point G˜ is empty, we simply insert a new edge e˜ (with new originating
and destination vertices) in G˜. The originating and destination vertices of e˜ get the
same labels as u and v, respectively.
Now, let us assume that we have processed edge e′ from G and inserted e˜′ in
G˜. Furthermore, let us assume that the next edge given by the depth-first search is
e′′ = (u′′, v′′). There are two cases: (1) e′  e′′ or (2) there is no edge that succeeds
e′, and e′′ is obtained by backtracking (i.e., stepping back on already processed edges
up to an edge which has an as yet unprocessed direct successor). The originating
and destination vertices of the new edge e˜′′ inserted in G˜ are determined as follows:
Case (1)
• Originating vertex: the originating vertex of e˜′′ is the destination vertex of e˜′.
• Destination vertex:
– if a direct successor f of e′′ has already been processed and the corre-
sponding edge f˜ has already been inserted in G˜, then the destination
vertex of e˜′′ is the originating vertex of f˜ ,
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– if no direct successor of e′′ has been processed yet, then the destination
vertex of e˜′′ can be any vertex in G˜ that has the same label as v′′ has,
given that this does not cause a directed loop inG˜,
– otherwise, a new vertex is inserted in G˜ with the same label as v′′ has,
and this new vertex becomes the destination vertex of e˜′′.
Case (2)
• Originating vertex: we perform a backtracking in G˜ parallel with the back-
tracking in G. The vertex, in which this parallel backtracking stops, becomes
the originating vertex of e˜′′.











protocol graph G unfolded protocol graph G~
e << f; e << g; g << h;



















Fig. 3. An example for unfolding a protocol graph
As an example, let us consider Fig. 3. Given the protocol graph on the left
hand side of the figure, the procedure builds the unfolded protocol graph on the
right hand side. According to the depth-first search, the edges are processed in the
following order: e, g, h, j , i , and f . e˜, g˜, and h˜ are simply inserted in G˜ one after
the other. In order to avoid a directed loop, when j˜ is inserted, we need to add a
new vertex with label A to G˜, and this new vertex becomes the destination vertex
of j˜ . Since j does not have any successor in G, we then perform a backtracking,
which stops at the destination vertex of h in G, and the destination vertex ofh˜ in
G˜. Therefore, the originating vertex of the next edge to insert (i.e., i˜ ) will be the
destination vertex of h˜. As before, in order to avoid a directed loop, we need to
add a new vertex, this time with label B, to G˜, and this new vertex becomes the
destination vertex of i˜ . Then we perform a backtracking again, which stops at the
destination vertex of e in G, and the destination vertex of e˜ in G˜. Therefore, the
originating vertex of the last edge f˜ will be the destination vertex of e˜. f has two
direct successors i and j in G, and both of them have already been processed and
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inserted in G˜. Thus, the destination vertex of f˜ will be the originating vertex of i˜
and j˜ .
The following lemma guarantees that, for all the direct successors f, f′, . . .
of an edge e, the corresponding edges f˜ , f˜ ′, . . . originate from the same vertex in G˜.
This ensures that we can always unambiguously determine the destination vertex
of an edge to be inserted in G˜ if its direct successors have already been processed
and inserted in G˜.
Lemma 5 If two concurrent edges e and f originate from the same vertex in G,
then the corresponding edges e˜ and f˜ originate from the same vertex in G˜.
Proof: Let us assume that the procedure processes e and inserts e˜ first. Then, it
continues with the successors of e. When all the successors of e are processed
we perform the backtracking in the protocol graph and in the (partial) unfolded
protocol graph as well. Since f is not processed yet the backtracking stops at the
originating vertex of f (which is also the originating vertex of e) in G and in the
originating vertex of e˜ in G˜. Therefore, this vertex (the originating vertex of e˜) will
be the originating vertex of f˜ . 2
The following statements are direct consequences of the unfolding procedure
given above:
Lemma 6 Let us consider a protocol graph G = (E, V ) and its unfolded protocol
graph G˜ = (E˜, V˜ ).
• G˜ is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG);
• if G is connected, then G˜ is connected as well;
• |E | = |E˜ | and there exists a one-to-one mapping m : E → E˜ such that if
e  f in G, then the destination vertex of m(e) = e˜ and the originating
vertex of m( f ) = f˜ are the same in G˜.
• The vertices of G˜ are labeled with the names of the protocol participants
in such a way that for any edge e˜ in G˜, the labels on the originating and
destination vertices of e˜ are the same as the labels on the originating and
destination vertices of m−1(e˜) = e in G, respectively.
Now, we are ready to state and prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 1 Any n-party challenge-response protocol for entity authentication, in
which each party authenticates every other party, uses at least 2n − 1 messages.
Proof: Let us consider the protocol graph G of the protocol and the unfolded
protocol graph G˜. First, using the corollary of Lemma4, we get that G is connected,
and from this, using Lemma 6, we get that G˜ is connected as well. Second, from the
corollary of Lemma 3, we get that each vertex u of G has an outgoing edge e and
an incoming edge e′ such that e ≺ e′. The corresponding edges in G˜ are e˜ = m(e)
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and e˜′ = m(e′), respectively. The originating vertex u˜ of e˜ and the destination
vertex v˜′ of e˜′ have the same labels in G˜, because they both inherited the label of
u in G. However, u˜ cannot be the same as v˜′, since according to Lemma 2 and the
construction of G˜, this would mean that there is a directed loop in G˜. This means
that each label is used at least twice in G˜, or in other words, that G˜ has at least 2n
vertices. It is well-known that the minimum number of edges that can connect 2n
vertices is 2n − 1. Therefore, G˜ has at least 2n − 1 edges. By Lemma 6, however,
G has the same number of edges as G˜, and each edge in G represents a message in
the protocol. 2
4. Two Lessons Learned
Before presenting our protocols, we recall two common flaws in entity authenti-
cation protocols by reviewing two protocols that exhibit these flaws. The first one
is a unilateral entity authentication protocol, which is similar to the protocol of
Example 2, but this time a symmetric key cryptography is used:
1. A → B : ra
2. B → A : {ra}Kab
The protocol works as follows: A sends an unpredictable random number ra to
B. B encrypts the received challenge with the symmetric key Kab that it shares
with A, and sends the encrypted random number {ra}Kab back to A. A decrypts
the response with the same key, and verifies that the resulted cleartext is indeed
its random number ra . The claim is that if this verification is successful, then A
authenticated B.
This is wrong, because A cannot be sure that it was B who encrypted ra with
Kab, since B is not the only one who can encrypt with this key. Ironically, it may
be A itself who generated {ra}Kab in a concurrent run of the same protocol initiated






Fig. 4. Reflection attack
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In this attack, the attacker impersonates B. In order to do so, it has to respond
to the challenge of A by encrypting ra with Kab. Since it does not possess this key, it
cannot itself perform the encryption. Instead, it starts a new instance of the protocol
with A pretending to be B, and challenges A with ra . Recall that, according to our
system model introduced in Section 2, A may run several instances of the protocol
concurrently, and it may play different roles in different instances. Here, A runs
two instances of the protocol, and in the first one it plays the initiator, while in the
second one it plays the responder role. Hence, A encrypts the false challenge with
Kab and sends the result to the attacker in the second instance. The attacker can
now replay it back to A and complete the attack in the first instance.
The usual solution proposed in the literature for this problem is to include a
direction label explicitly in each encrypted message. A protocol can, for instance,
adopt the convention that each encrypted message contains the name of the principal
who generated it (i.e., a from field). In a more economical solution, the direction
label can even be a single bit. One can imagine, for instance, that the names of the
principals can be lexicographically ordered (bit strings typically have this property).
Then each encrypted message sent by A to B, where A < B, could contain a 0, while
encrypted messages in the reverse direction could contain a 1. When a principal
decrypts a message, it looks at the direction label, and if this indicates that the
message was generated by the principal itself, then the message is discarded.
The conclusion is the following:
Lesson 1: If symmetric key encryption is used, then some mechanism is needed to
ensure that the intended direction of each encrypted message can unambiguously
be determined by those who can decrypt the message. 2
The next example for a flawed entity authentication protocol is the WOO–
LAM protocol [12]:
1. A → B : A
2. B → A : rb
3. A → B : {rb}Kas
4. B → S : {A, {rb}Kas }Kbs
5. S → B : {rb}Kbs
A major difference between this protocol and the previous one is that this one uses a
designated principal called the authentication server S. Instead of sharing keys with
each other, principals share a secret key with the authentication server. It is also
assumed that the authentication server is trusted for correctly translating a message
encrypted with the key of a principal to a message encrypted with the key of another
principal.
The WOO–LAM protocol works as follows: A claims that its identity is A.
In order to verify this, B challenges A with an unpredictable random number rb.
A proves its identity by encrypting the challenge with the key Kas , which it shares
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with the authentication server S. The response {rb}Kas is sent to B. Since B does
not possess Kas , it cannot verify the response. Therefore, it calls for the help of
the authentication server: B sends the message {A, {rb}Kas }Kbs to S. S decrypts
the request and then decrypts A’s response inside; it knows that it has to use Kas
for decrypting the response, because the request contains the name of A. Then,
S encrypts the resulted random number with the key Kbs and sends {rb}Kbs to B.
Finally, B decrypts the message of S and verifies that it received back its random













Fig. 5. Attack against the WOO–LAM authentication protocol
This time, it is not so obvious why this is wrong. Nevertheless, the protocol
is known to be vulnerable [1] to the following attack (Fig. 5): Let us assume that
the attacker compromised the key of a legitimate principal M of the system. This
means that the attacker knows the key Kms shared by M and the server S. Using
this key, it can impersonate A (who is not compromised) to B. The attacker starts
two instances of the protocol with B concurrently; the first instance is started in
the name of A and the second one is in the name of M . B generates two random
numbers rb and r ′b and sends them as challenges to A and M , respectively. These
messages are intercepted by the attacker and they never arrive to A and M . The
attacker then encrypts rb, which was intended for A, with the key Kms and sends
the result {rb}Kms to B in both instances of the protocol. It is very likely that the
protocol is implemented in such a way that B does not check responses received in
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different instances of the protocol for equality. Therefore, B believes that it received
the responses from A and M , and sends the corresponding requests {A, {rb}Kms }Kbs
and {M, {rb}Kms }Kbs , respectively, to S. S decrypts the received responses with
Kas and Kms , respectively, thus, using the wrong key for the first response. Let us
denote the result of decrypting {rb}Kms with Kas by x . Because of the properties
of symmetric key ciphers, x looks like a random number. Since the authentication
server expects a random number as a result of the decryption, and it cannot check
that it is the right number, because it does not know what was the challenge sent by
B to A, it accepts x , and does not detect the attack. It responds to the requests of B
by sending {x}Kbs and {rb}Kbs to B. When B verifies these messages, it recognizes
that the first response is wrong. It does, however, accept the second one, which
contains rb, and since this number was the challenge for A, B attributes the second
response to A. Finally, B concludes that A was alive and responded to its challenge,
while someone might try to impersonate M .
The source of the flaw is that the authentication server suppresses some critical
information when it responds to a request: it does not tell the requesting principal
which key it used to decrypt the response. At first glance, one might think that the
requesting principal can infer this information from the context, but, as the previous
attack shows, this is false. Therefore, it is more secure to mention which key was
used by putting a key identifier or the name of the corresponding principal in the
last message.
The lesson we can learn from this example is the following:
Lesson 2: If a trusted mediator is used to translate a message encrypted with a given
key K to a message encrypted with another key K′, then all the semantical informa-
tion of the original message must be retained. In particular, the translated message
should contain the key identifier of K or other equivalent data from which this
information can be securely inferred by the destination of the translated message.
2
5. Multi-Party Entity Authentication Protocols
In Section 3 we proved that the lower bound on the number of messages of n-party
challenge-response protocols for entity authentication is 2n−1. In this section, we
present two protocols that achieve this lower bound. Both protocols have the same
message passing structure, but they differ in the assumptions about trust among the
protocol participants, and thus, in the content (semantics) of messages.
5.1. Message Passing Structure
Before going into the details of our protocols, it is worth to tell some words about
their message passing structure. We recall Lemma3, which states that if A authenti-
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cates B in a given challenge-response protocol, then there must be three edges e, e′,
and f in the protocol graph such that e is an outgoing edge from u, e′ is an incoming
edge to u, f is an outgoing edge from v, and e ≺ f  e′, where u and v are the
vertices that correspond to A and B, respectively. This actually means, that in the
unfolded protocol graph, there is a directed path, which starts from and ends in a
vertex that is labeled with A, and goes through a vertex that is labeled with B. If A
authenticates every other party B,C, . . . in the protocol, then each of these parties,
or more precisely vertices that are labeled with their names, must be traversed by a
directed path starting from and ending in a vertex that is labeled with A. Note that
one single path can do the job (see Fig. 6 (a)). If B,C, . . . also authenticate every
other party in the protocol, then there is a similar path for B,C, . . . as well. We
obtain the protocol with the least number of messages by maximally overlapping
these paths (see Fig. 6 (b)). The resulting protocol graph has exactly 2n − 1 edges
(Fig. 6 (c)).
A B C A
B C A B
C A B C













A B C A
Fig. 6. Message passing structure of the basic protocols
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5.2. Protocols
In order to make the presentation easier, we describe the three-party versions of our
protocols in detail and sketch the general n-party versions only briefly. In addition,
we should also mention that our protocols use symmetric key cryptography, but
it is straightforward to obtain the versions that use asymmetric key cryptography
by replacing symmetric key encryption with digital signatures of the appropriate
parties.
Protocol 1:
• Principle: The basic idea of Protocol 1 is the following: Each participant
generates an unpredictable random number, which is used as a challenge.
Challenges are passed around among the protocol participants in a circulating
message. Each participant that receives the message and sees the challenges
that the message contains includes its identifier in the message before passing
it further to the next participant. When a challenge gets back to the principal
that generated it, the message contains the list of those principals that saw
the challenge and forwarded the message. These forwarding principals must
have been alive during the protocol run.
• Assumptions: We assume that each pair of principals in the system share a
long-term secret key. The secret key shared between A and B, for instance,
is denoted by Kab. We also assume that principals trust each other for exe-
cuting the protocol honestly. In particular, each principal must be trusted for
correctly attributing a received message to its sender and faithfully copying
all the relevant fields of the received message into the message that is passed
further. We will return to this issue of trust later when we analyze Protocol 1
in Subsection 5.3.. Finally, we assume that each protocol participant knows
(or at least has an assumption about) who the other participants are from the
context or additional plaintext fields not mentioned in the description below.
• Messages of the three-party version:
1. A → B : ra
2. B → C : rb, {B, ra}Kbc
3. C → A : rc{C, rb, B, ra}Kac
4. A → B : {A, rc,C, rb}Kab
5. B → C : {B, A, rc}Kbc
• Description of the three-party version: A generates an unpredictable random
number ra , and sends it to B in message 1. Upon reception of message 1, B
generates an unpredictable random number rb, encrypts its own identifier B
and the random number ra with the key Kbc, and sends rb and the result of the
encryption to C in message 2. The identifier in the encrypted part serves as
an explicit direction label that allows B to recognize its own messages. Upon
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reception of message 2, C decrypts the encrypted part, and verifies that it
was indeed generated by B by checking the identifier in the first field. If this
verification is successful, then C generates an unpredictable random number
rc, encrypts its own identifier C , the random number rb, the identifier of B,
and the random number ra with the key Kac, and sends rc and the result of the
encryption to A in message 3. The identifier of C serves again as a direction
label. When A receives message 3, it decrypts the encrypted part of it, and
verifies that it was indeed generated by C by checking the identifier in the first
field. Furthermore, it checks if it received back its random number ra and if the
message contains the identifier of B too. If these verifications are successful,
then A authenticated B and C , and it continues by encrypting its own identifier
A, the random number rc, the identifier of C , and the random number rb with
the key Kab. A sends the result of the encryption to B in message 4. When
B receives message 4, it decrypts it, and verifies that it was indeed generated
by A by checking the identifier in the first field. Furthermore, it checks if it
received back its random number rb and if the message contains the identifier
of C too. If these verifications are successful, then B authenticated A and C ,
and it continues by encrypting its own identifier B, the identifier of A, and
the random number rc with the key Kbc. B sends the result of the encryption
to C in message 5. Finally, when C receives message 5, it decrypts it, and
verifies that it was indeed generated by B by checking the identifier in the
first field. It also checks if it received back its random number rc and if the
message contains the identifier of A too. If these verifications are successful,
then C authenticated A and B and the protocol terminates.
• Messages of the n-party version:
1. P1 → P2 : r1
2. P2 → P3 : r2, {P2, r1}K2,3
3. P3 → P4 : r3, {P3, r2, P2, r1}K3,4
4. P4 → P5 : r4, {P4, r3, P3, r2, P2, r1}K4,5
. . . . . . . . .
n. Pn → P1 : rn, {Pn, rn−1, Pn−1, rn−2, Pn−2, . . . , r2, P2, r1}K1,n
n + 1. P1 → P2 : {P1, rn, Pn, rn−1, Pn−1, . . . , r3, P3, r2}K1,2
n + 2. P2 → P3 : {P2, P1, rn, Pn, rn−1, Pn−1, . . . , r4, P4, r3}K2,3
. . . . . . . . .
2n − 1. Pn−1 → Pn : {Pn−1, Pn−2, Pn−3, . . . , P1, rn}Kn−1,n
• Remark for the n-party version: Let us consider any of the encrypted mes-
sages of the protocol above. For a given random number r in this message, the
identifiers that stand before r correspond to those parties who have already
seen and forwarded r . For instance, in message n, the identifiers before r2 are
P3, P4, . . . , Pn , and indeed, apart from P1, all the participants have already
seen r2 when message n is sent. Therefore, when a party receives back its
random number in a message, it must check if all the other parties are listed
before its random number in the message.
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Note that Protocol 1 takes into account Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 of Section4..
First, we used sender identifiers (from fields) as explicit direction labels in messages
in order to prevent reflection attacks. Second, since each party acts as a trusted
mediator, and translates messages encrypted with one key for messages encrypted
with another key, we ensured that all the semantical information of the original
message is retained by keeping all fields that are relevant for the further processing
of the translated message (including the identifier of the sender of the original
message).
Protocol 2:
• Principle: The main drawback of Protocol 1 is that it relies on the assumption
that the protocol participants trust each other for honestly executing the pro-
tocol. In Protocol 2, we remove this assumption. The main idea of Protocol 2
is that we allow each protocol participant to directly verify who responded
its challenge. Like in Protocol 1, the challenge of each participant is passed
around among the other participants, but unlike in Protocol 1, this time it is
encrypted with the key that is shared by the challenging and the responding
principals before it is passed further to the next participant. Indeed, respond-
ing parties do not encrypt the challenge itself, but the encrypted challenge
that they receive from the previous responding party. The challenging party
finally receives back its random number encrypted by every other party, one
after the other. The challenging party verifies the response by decrypting
it with the keys it shares with the other parties. If, after performing all the
decryptions, it recovers its original random number, then it is convinced that
all the other parties were alive during the protocol run.
• Assumptions: We assume that each pair of principals in the system share a
long-term secret key, and each protocol participant knows (or at least has
an assumption about) who the other participants are from the context or
additional plaintext fields not mentioned in the description below.
• Messages of the three-party version:
1. A → B : ra
2. B → C : rb, {B, ra}Kab
3. C → A : rc, {C, rb}Kbc, {C, {B, ra}Kab}Kac
4. A → B : {A, rc}Kac, {A, {C, rb}Kbc}Kab
5. B → C : {B, {A, rc}Kac}Kbc
• Description of the three-party version: A generates an unpredictable random
number ra , and sends it to B in message 1. Upon reception of message 1,
B generates an unpredictable random number rb, encrypts its own identifier
B and the random number ra with the key Kab, and sends rb and the result
of the encryption to C in message 2. Like in Protocol 1, in Protocol 2 as
well, the identifier of the encrypting party in an encrypted message always
serves as an explicit direction label to foil reflection attacks. Upon reception
of message 2, C generates an unpredictable random number rc, encrypts
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its own identifier C and the random number rb with Kbc, encrypts its own
identifier C and the encrypted part of message 2 with Kac, and sends rc and
the results of the encryptions to A in message 3. When A receives message 3,
it first verifies the last encrypted part of it by decrypting it with the keys Kac
and Kab, and checking the identifiers and the random number found inside.
If the identifiers match those of C and B, and the random number matches
ra, then A authenticated B and C , and it continues by encrypting its own
identifier A and the random number rc with the key Kac, and encrypting
its own identifier A and the other encrypted part of message 3 with the key
Kab. Then A sends the results of the encryptions to B in message 4. When
B receives message 4, it verifies the last encrypted part of it by decrypting
it with the keys Kab and Kbc, and checking the identifiers and the random
number found inside. If the identifiers match those of A and C , and the
random number matches rb, then B authenticated A and C , and it continues
by encrypting its own identifier B and the other encrypted part of message 4
with the key Kbc. Then B sends the result of the encryption to C in message 5.
Finally, when C receives message 5, it verifies it by decrypting it with the
keys Kbc and Kac, and checking the identifiers and the random number found
inside. If the identifiers match those of B and A, and the random number
matches rc, then C authenticated A and B, and the protocol terminates.
• Messages of the n-party version:
1. P1 → P2 : r1
2. P2 → P3 : r2, {P2, r1}K1,2
3. P3 → P4 : r3, {P3, r2}K2,3, {P3, {P2, r1}K1,2}K1,3
. . . . . . . . .
n. Pn → P1 : rn, {Pn, rn−1}Kn−1,n ,{Pn, {Pn−1, rn−2}Kn−2,n−1}Kn−2,n , . . . ,{Pn, {Pn−1, . . . {P2, r1}K1,2 . . .}K1,n−1}K1,n
n + 1. P1 → P2 : {P1, rn}K1,n ,{P1, {Pn, rn−1}Kn−1,n }K1,n−1, . . . ,{P1, {Pn, . . . {P3, r2}K2,3 . . .}K2,n }K1,2
n + 2. P2 → P3 : {P2, {P1, rn}K1,n }K2,n ,{P2, {P1, {Pn, rn−1}Kn−1,n }K1,n−1}K2,n−1, . . . ,{P2, {P1, . . . {P4, r3}K3,4 . . .}K1,3}K2,3
. . . . . . . . .
2n − 1. Pn−1 → Pn : {Pn−1, {Pn−2, . . . {P1, rn}K1,n . . .}Kn−2,n }Kn−1,n
Note that Protocol 2 takes into account Lesson 1 by using the identifiers of the
encrypting principal in each encrypted message as an explicit direction label that
prevents reflection attacks. It does not, however, use Lesson 2, because here princi-
pals do not translate messages encrypted with one key for messages encrypted with
another key.
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5.3. Analysis and Comparison
In order to better understand Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, and the differences between
them, we sketch how their main assumptions and achievements could be formalized
in a formal logic called SvO [11]. We analyze the three-party protocols from the
point of view of party A, but the same reasoning applies for n-party protocols
(n > 3) and the other parties as well.
The first question is: How can the goal of entity authentication be modelled
in the SvO logic? We recall that entity authentication means that a party, say A, is
convinced that another party, say B, was alive and sent some messages in a bounded
time interval in the local time of A. In the SvO logic, the following formula can
represent this:
A believes (B says X),
where X is some message or a part of a message (typically a certain function of a
fresh nonce generated by A).
Now, let us investigate how such a formula can be derived for Protocol 1. The
last message that A receives in Protocol 1 is message 3. Only the encrypted part is
interesting for A, which we idealize as:
{C, rb, B, ra, (B said ra)}Kac .
Using the assumption that A believes that Kac is a good shared secret key between
A and B, we can easily derive that
A believes (C said (C, rb, B, ra, (B said ra))).
Since A believes that its own random number ra is fresh, A believes that the message
received from C is fresh. This allows us to derive that
A believes (C says (C, rb, B, ra, (B said ra))),
from which we can easily get that
A believes (C says ra) (1)
and
A believes (C says (B said ra)) (2)
(1) means that A authenticated C . In order to go further and derive that A authen-
ticated B as well, the following must hold:
A believes (C controls (B said ra)). (3)
Then, from (2) and (3) we can derive that
A believes (B said ra).
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Since we assumed that A believes that its own random number ra is fresh, we get
that
A believes (B says ra).
This means that A authenticated B.
Note, however, that (3) cannot be derived from the protocol, thus, we must
make the assumption that it holds. Indeed, (3) models A’s trust in C for correctly
attributing messages to B and for correctly forwarding the content of these messages
to A.
Now, we turn our attention to Protocol 2. The last message received by A
is again message 3. Only the last encrypted part is interesting for A, which we
idealize in the following way:
{C, {B, ra}Kab}Kac .
Assuming that A believes that Kab and Kac are good shared secrets between A and
B, and between A and C , respectively, we can derive that
A believes (C said {B, ra}Kab) (4)
and
A believes (B said ra) (5)
Since A believes that its own random number ra is fresh, we can easily derive in
the SvO logic that A believes that {B, ra}Kab is fresh as well. Thus, from (4) we get
that
A believes (C says {B, ra}Kab)
and from (5) we get that
A believes (B says ra).
This means that A authenticated both B and C .
Note that, although Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 achieve the same goal, unlike
Protocol 1, Protocol 2 does not need any assumptions about existing trust between
the parties.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the problem of multi-party entity authentication. We
proved that the lower bound on the number of messages of multi-party challenge-
response protocols for entity authentication is 2n − 1, where n is the number of the
parties participating in the protocol. Our proof is based on modelling the protocol
with a directed graph, the vertices of which correspond to the parties, and the
edges of which correspond to the messages of the protocol, and defining a partial
ordering on the edges according to the timing of messages in the protocol. Besides,
allowing us to prove the lower bound on the number of messages, this model proved
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to be helpful in understanding some interesting structural properties of challenge-
response type entity authentication protocols.
We presented two protocols that are efficient in the sense that they use the
minimum number of messages required to solve the multi-party entity authentica-
tion problem based on challenge-response principles (i.e., they achieve the lower
bound on the number of messages). The protocols have the same message pass-
ing structure, but they differ in the assumptions about trust among the parties, and
thus, in the content (semantics) of the messages. We analyzed and compared our
protocols with the help of the SvO authentication protocol logic. We note that our
protocols can easily be extended to server assisted entity authentication and session
key establishment, which we did not discuss in this paper due to space limitations.
Finally, we should note that, in this paper, we were mainly concerned with
minimizing the number of messages in challenge-response protocols for entity au-
thentication. On the one hand, this makes sense, because each message sent involves
the use of several lower level protocols down in the communication protocol stack,
and thus, produces some overhead. By minimizing the number of messages of
the authentication protocol, we can minimize this overhead. On the other hand,
minimizing the number of messages does not necessarily minimize the required
bandwidth. If the protocol uses few messages, but these are long, then we do not
gain much in bandwidth, and a protocol with more but smaller messages might be
more desirable. Thus, in general, we are facing a more complex optimization prob-
lem, in which both the number of messages and the total amount of data exchanged
in the protocol must be taken into consideration. We leave this issue for future
study.
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